At a time of exceptionally heightened global security tensions, Iran might be on the cusp of a historic acquisition of Russia’s Sukhoi Su-35 Super Flanker fighter. The anticipated deal could immediately affect defense planning among other Gulf states that have long viewed their neighbor as a primary threat.

For almost two decades the UAE and other Gulf states have optimized their defenses to mainly shield against missile and suicide drone attacks, such as those from rebel Houthi forces in Yemen. With both Iran’s Air Force (IRIAF) and the aviation wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operating aircraft of designs that are between 35 to 50 years old, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait have all had less reason for concern about Iranian air power.

That outlook has driven the UAE’s big investments in the long-range Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and medium-range Patriot PAC-3 air and missile defense systems, along with the Russian-made Pantsir-S1 complex. The Gulf country also signed a $3.5 billion contract for the South Korean-built II KM-SAM air defense systems.

However, news reports over the past two years since the 2021 Dubai Airshow have fueled expectations that Iran could soon receive up to 24 of the Su-35 export model.  A combat aircraft of that caliber would significantly boost Iran’s capability to conduct offensive air operations, as well as provide its forces with a more capable interceptor platform.

Robert Czulda, a Polish military analyst at the University of Łódź and a former visiting professor at Islamic Azad University in Iran, published an assessment earlier this year that noted the benefits of the Su-35s over earlier types operated by Iran. “The Su-35s are more versatile than Iran’s current force of MiG-29s, which were designed mainly for intercepting other aircraft, and Su-22s and Su-25s, which are suited for engaging ground targets," it said.  "The Su-35, which is equipped with the Irbis-E radar station, is a multipurpose jet, suitable both for air superiority and ground-attack operations.”

The IRIAF now operates a fleet of aging U.S.-made aircraft acquired by pre-revolutionary Iran in the 1970s, such as the McDonnell-Douglas F-4, the Northrop F-5, and the Grumman F-14.  Russian aircraft purchased by the Islamic Republic in the 1990s and a small number of the Chinese-produced Chengdu J-7 models—reverse-engineered copies of the Mikoyan MiG-21—supplement the U.S-made jets.

The Su-35 represents at least a generational advance over any of those platforms and decades of design innovation and modernization from the original Su-27 design.  Its on-board radar and avionics suite are several orders of magnitude more advanced than anything else in the Iranian arsenal and it can fire several of the most advanced Russian air-launched weapons.

Several other nations already operating Su-27 or Su-30 models also appear logical candidates for the “upgrade” to their air forces that a Su-35 acquisition would bring to them. However, so far, the only export customer for the Su-35 has been China, which spent years negotiating for a procurement due to Moscow insisting that Beijing purchase at least 48 of their aircraft. The two sides eventually settled on 24 units.

A potentially complicating factor with Su-35 exports relates to the aircraft’s Irbis-E radar set, which has suffered from some very long production lead times. According to a Ukrainian company executive familiar with the program, the batch of Su-35s on offer to Iran originally was supposed to go to Egypt, which finally canceled the order due to problems with radar deliveries.

With Iran’s geriatric fleet of combat aircraft being barely patched together, the Islamic Republic might well need to acquire more imports from allies like Russia. But some question whether Russia’s defense industry, disrupted by sanctions imposed following the invasion of Ukraine, can supply larger volumes.