The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea's (DPRK) numerous test firings of ballistic missiles and underground nuclear tests have raised many questions about how it gained these advanced capabilities. In particular, how and from where did this isolated nation with a struggling economy acquire the necessary technologies to develop these weapon systems? Former Soviet republics are blamed in some reports, but Iran is named by some sources in the U.S. intelligence community.
North Korea’s ambitions have been realized despite a comprehensive set of sanctions imposed by the United Nations (UN). A lengthy report released by the UN last February concluded that some nations had surreptitiously sold equipment, subsystems and access to technology that have aided Pyongyang’s program. These sales had been enabled by the interconnected networks of middlemen, shell companies and offshore entities that Pyongyang had created. The DPRK has also cooperated with Iran in development of its ballistic missile designs, and the two nations have been known to share innovations that they have developed in exchange for some technology or capacity that the other does not have.
In one particular instance, North Korea “was able to establish a company in a third country, building up significant international recognition, including through participation in prominent regional arms fairs and by selling high-end arms and related material in multiple countries,” according to the UN report. “This case demonstrates the increasingly sophisticated nature of evasion of sanctions by the DPRK and illustrates important and previously unknown trends,” the report added.
Another report—released last August by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London—said the Soviet-era Glushko RD-250 was assessed to be the basis for the design of the rocket motor that was used in the test firings of North Korea’s Hwasong-12 and Hwasong-14 ballistic missiles, the latter rated as having intercontinental range.
The IISS report notes that “no other country has transitioned from a medium-range to an intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) capability in such a short time.” Michael Elleman, the report’s author, found that the engine technology came from the YuzhMash plant in Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine.
However, the head of Ukraine’s National Security Council (RNBO), Oleksandr Turchynov, issued an official response to the report stating that “since 1991, Ukraine has not produced the rocket engines RD-250 and its modifications. The production line for these engines at Yuzhmash was dismantled in 1994. Since then, Ukraine has had no capacity for the production of such engines.”
Subsequent to the denials by Ukrainian authorities, U.S. intelligence sources speaking anonymously to U.S. media outlets stated that North Korea has an indigenous capability to manufacture an engine in the class of the RD-250. However, whether Pyongyang is doing this independently or in cooperation with another nation is an unresolved question. One intelligence community source was also quoted as saying that if the DPRK is building this variant of the RD-250 design, it is likely that the country “co-developed” it with Iran.
