Brazilian airspace control organization DECEA kicked off its “First Antidrone Technology Symposium” May 13, with DECEA director Lt. General Jeferson Domingues de Freitas calling for “powerful and intelligent solutions to problems caused by malice or neglect.” Regarding the drone threat, he identified the need to “detect, identify, [and] mitigate, preferably in single application.” A range of local and foreign experts agreed that there is no “magic bullet” against drone incursions anywhere, that electronics-intensive airports pose special challenges, and evolving drone technology requires evolving countermeasures. Drones can be detected with the right mix of sensors for the situation, but responses such as jamming are limited by the need to affect only the drone, and by existing legislation that predates the drone threat.

Pilots of drones invading protected airspace are “clueless, careless, and malicious,” according to Joshua Holtzman, FAA director, Office of National Security Programs and Incident Response. Countermeasures proposed against the first two categories included “electronic fences” to warn off pilots or even turn away or deactivate drones. More active measures would include jamming or "kinetic" responses including lasers.

The three-day conference took place in São Paulo at Anhembi-Morumbi University, which has the country’s largest aviation sciences program. The meeting attracted more than 280 participants, 40 percent in air force uniforms. The second day opened with presentations on currently implemented solutions, such as Israel's "Iron Dome." Crisis coordinator Cesar Augusto Borges Tuna described the challenges drones pose for Guarulhos Airport.

A collision with a drone will cause more damage than one with a bird of similar size, Matteo Sensini of Italian supplier IDS explained, speculating on the effects of a collision that's not accidental, with drones carrying explosive devices, even home-manufactured ones. His firm handled counter-measures for a G7 summit in Italy, among other events and locations where malice was a real threat.

Several speakers brought up prisons, both as examples of places where jamming is specifically permitted by law and sometimes implemented, and as places where bad actors use drones to deliver contraband. While there's no special need to fear malice against the GRU Airport, aircraft are especially vulnerable to unintended collisions with drones, and there is a prison near GRU, where there has been illicit drone activity.

The last day of the conference was devoted to legislative and legal measures to allow more active responses to drones, including both "soft" responses such as taking control of the drone or forcing it to land, and "hard" responses such as lasers and guns, which have evolved over the last few years from a Ghostbusters-style backpack, to a handgun with a soccer-ball sized bulge.

The event included two live demonstrations of detection systems set up on the university's roof. The systems showed a mix of strengths and limitations, with scanners automatically triangulating on an approaching threat and focusing a camera on the drone, as well as capturing its make, model, and serial number. A real-time map tracked not only the drone's flights but also the launch point and the pilot's position. However, engaging the jammer of one system tripped a circuit breaker; the other's scanners were confused by a jammer being placed close by.

The São José dos Campos aerodrome will be testing anti-drone systems in June and July, which should allow for a more fair and thorough evaluation of systems for the Brazilian market.

A Different Public

“The drone piloting public isn’t composed of aviation people. They don’t know what an FIR is, and requests for permission to use airspace had to be submitted by fax,” said DECEA systems analyst João Ximenes, describing the challenges faced in producing the new SARPAS system for submitting and processing requests to use airspace.

“We are focused on compliant navigation,” is how Holzman described the FAA's approach, “A rule is being written” for a system in which manufacturers must put a serial number on each UAV, and the UAV must transmit the number and other data. Such an approach would be dependent on the cooperation of the many manufacturers to create a library, similar to that used by anti-viruses, to identify drones and issue appropriate responses.

But drones can be modified or home-assembled to ignore countermanding orders. While jamming Wi-Fi, RF, or GPS signals would confuse most drones, those relying on internal navigation using photo-reconnaissance or other techniques would be unaffected by jamming. Major Rafael Paes of the Air Force’s Institute for Advanced Studies described how “massive data processing” can determine position far more precisely than GPS when using reference images from previously known positions.

Holistic Perspective

Bruce De Bies of Hensoldt (formerly Airbus Security), said, “Sensor mix is critical. The purpose is to to give advance warning of a threat to the asset you're protecting.” Radar can detect a target far away, while sound can detect one close in. “The key question is, “What are you trying to protect, and where are you trying to protect it?” A refinery or a prison requires different protection than an airport, but the right solution is specific to the site, and “not something that comes out of a box.” A downtown airport and one beyond the suburbs have different needs in sensors.

De Bies said that on countermeasures “we’re learning as we go,” showing man-portable systems and vehicle-mounted systems that can respond to threats and fixed systems to cover an entire site. “The key is scalability to move between solutions, and solutions need to be ‘future-proof’” to meet changing threats.