The FAA has begun a process that could lead to mandating retrofit of safer passenger seats and restraints as well as more fire-resistant fuel systems in legacy normal- and transport-category rotorcraft.

In September the agency charged the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) with making recommendations to enhance the safety of normal- and transport-category rotorcraft, even those that remain in production, whose certification basis predates crashworthiness and occupant protection standards adopted in the 1980s and 1990s. The FAA noted that most designs currently in production are “grandfathered” and therefore a relatively small percentage of the current civil fleet, estimated at 16 percent at the end of last year, had complied with modern requirements for crash-resistant fuel systems, for example. The ARAC is forming a Rotorcraft Occupant Protection Working Group and is soliciting members through early this month. The group will be tasked with providing advice and making recommendations to the ARAC ahead of what likely will be proposed rulemaking by the FAA. For all intents and purposes the cake is already in the oven, and the working group would appear to provide the industry with its only opportunity to influence the degree of the outcome.

Improving Survivability

In its November 5 federal notice of the working group, the FAA noted, “While the number of U.S. helicopter accidents and the corresponding accident rate over the past 10 years has steadily decreased, during that same period data associated with fatal helicopter accidents and fatalities remains virtually unchanged. A number of regulations were promulgated in the 1980s and 1990s to address and greatly improve occupant protection in a survivable emergency landing or accident. These occupant-protection improvements involve seat systems that reduce the likelihood of fatal injuries to occupants in a crash; structural requirements that maintain a survivable volume and restrain large items of mass above and behind the occupant; and fuel systems that reduce the likelihood of an immediate post-crash fire. If the occupant-protection improvement rules are not incorporated in new production helicopters, there will be no meaningful reduction in the number of fatalities in helicopter accidents.”

The FAA cited data from its own Rotorcraft Directorate and its Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) with regard to 97 fatal helicopter accidents between 2008 and 2013 related to post-crash fire and blunt-force trauma. It found that post-crash fire occurred in 39 percent of Part 27 aircraft without fuel systems meeting crash resistance requirements and contributed to 20 percent of the fatalities in those accidents. It further discovered that only 16 percent of all U.S.-registered rotorcraft were in compliance with the fuel system crash resistance requirements even though those requirements had been in force for 20 years at the time of the study. CAMI data identified blunt force trauma as the cause of death in 92 percent of all fatal U.S. helicopter accidents between 2008 and 2013; and the cause of death in 80 percent of the Part 27 accidents where a post-crash fire occurred. “The Rotorcraft Directorate further discovered that only 10 percent of U.S.-registered, type-certified rotorcraft complied with increased occupant protection measures related to blunt force trauma mandated in the (FAR) 27.562 and 29.562 rules, despite the rules being in effect for 25 years at the time of the study.”

“Additional research found that about 9,000 occupants had been involved in U.S. helicopter accidents in the 25 years since (FAR) 27.562 and 29.562 became effective. Only 2 percent of helicopters in those accidents were compliant with (FAR) 27.562 and 29.562. More than 1,300 occupants were killed in accidents involving 98 percent of helicopters that were not compliant with (FAR) 27.562 and 29.562,” the FAA noted.  

The working group is charged with performing a cost-benefit analysis for “incorporating the existing occupant protection standards” into “newly manufactured rotorcraft” within six months and with making specific recommendations that address the viability of alternative performance-based occupant protection safety regulations.